Contemporary semantic theory rests upon lively theoretical disputes about the meaning of words, the proper form of semantic theory, and, ultimately, on the very possibility of semantic theory itself. Jay L. Garfield and Murray Kiteley have collected, in Meaning and Truth, the definitive articles on the history of semantics and the primary voices debating the interpretation of description, the theory of truth intensionality, the structure of meaning, natural language, and the relation of semantics to pragmatics. The details, complexities, and charming eccentricities of language thus become visible against a background of abstract theory.

Undergraduate and graduate students of semantics, linguistics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of language will now be able to encounter all of the important theoretical debates of modern semantics in a single volume. Selections begin with the classic essay by Mill, “Of Names and Propositions,” include such standards as “General Semantics” by Lewis and “Actualism” by Plantinga, and conclude with a chapter on “Linguistic Approaches to Semantics.”

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments 
Preface 
General Introduction                                                                         Jay L. Garfield and Murray Kiteley
I. THE BEGINNINGS
Introduction 
Of Names and Propositions                                                              John Stuart Mill 
On Sense and Nominatum                                                                Gottlob Frege 
The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics Alfred Tarski 
On Denoting                                                                                     Bertrand Russell 

II. ON DESCRIPTIONS 
Introduction 
On Referring                                                                                      P. F. Strawson 
Mr. Strawson on Referring                                                                 Bertrand Russell 
Meaning and Necessity                                                                      Rudolf Carnap 
Reference and Definite Descriptions                                                   Keith Donnellan 
Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference                                    Saul Kripke 
Presupposition and Two-Dimensional Logic                                       Merrie Bergmann 
Dthat                                                                                                 David Kaplan 
On the Logic of Demonstratives                                                         David Kaplan 

III. ON TARSKI 
Introduction 
Truth and Meaning                                                                            Donald Davidson
Tarski’s Theory of Truth                                                                   Hartry Field 
Physicalism and Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski                         John McDowell 

IV. INTENSIONALITY 
Introduction 
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes                                              W. V. O. Quine 
On Saying That                                                                                 Donald Davidson 
An Overview of Montague Semantics                                                Steven Weisler 
Subjectivity’s Bailiwick and the Person of Its Bailiff                            Murray Kiteley 

V. THE STRUCTURE OF MEANING 
Introduction 
Two Types of Quantifiers                                                                  Norbert Hornstein 
A Logical Theory of Verb-Phrase Deletion                                        Ivan A. Sag 
Structured Meanings                                                                         Max Cresswell 
Structural Ambiguity                                                                         Max Cresswell 

VI. POSSIBLE WORLDS 
Introduction 
Propositions                                                                                     Robert Stalnaker 
Possible Worlds                                                                               David Lewis 
Actualism and Possible Worlds                                                         Alvin Plantinga 
The Trouble with Possible Worlds                                                    William Lycan

VII. PRAGMATICS 
Introduction 
On Specificity                                                                                  Annabel Cormack and 
                                                                                                       Ruth Kempson  
Metaphorese                                                                                   Harold Skulsky 
Metaphorical Assertions                                                                  Merrie Bergmann 
The Problem of the Essential Indexical                                              John Perry 
References 

JAY L. GARFIELD, an associate professor of philosophy in the School of Communications and Cognitive Science at Hampshire College, is also a member of the Core Faculty of the University of Massachusetts Cognitive Science Institute. His previous books are Belief in Psychology, Cognitive Science: An Introduction, and Foundations of Cognitive Science: The Essential Readings.

MURRAY KITELEY is the Sophia Smith Professor Emertius of Philosophy at Smith College, in Northampton, Massachusetts.